Constitutionality of the Incorporated Bar Act by Whitlow, Henry O.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 26 | Issue 1 Article 5
1937
Constitutionality of the Incorporated Bar Act
Henry O. Whitlow
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the State and Local
Government Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Whitlow, Henry O. (1937) "Constitutionality of the Incorporated Bar Act," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 26 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol26/iss1/5
STUDENT NOTES
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE INCORPORATED BAR ACT
The Kentucky Legislature conferred authority upon the Court of
Appeals to promulgate rules of practice or procedure for disciplining
attorneys.1 In pursuance of this authority the Court created a board
to hear complaints against members of the bar. This board heard
charges against the defendant and made recommendations to the
Court of Appeals. Two constitutional grounds of defense to action by
the Court were urged; (1) The Court of Appeals has appellate juris-
diction only,2 and (2) The statute provides for an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to the judiciary. The Court of Appeals
refused to sustain these defenses and acted upon the recommendations
of the board.'
The theory of "inherent judicial power" upon which the Court
bases the exception of disbarment proceedings to the constitutional
provision giving the Court appellate jurisdiction only, may be sup-
ported by numerous decisions in other jurisdictions. 5 In these cases,
however, a similar constitutional provision was not in issue and the
principle Invoked by the Kentucky Court was announced in support
of other contentions.
The Missouri Court, with a dissenting opinion, reluctantly
assumed jurisdiction to disbar under a similar constitutional provi-
sion." This decision was based entirely on the ground of stare decisis.
This construction was modified in Virginia where it was held that
the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to absolutely disbar
In an original proceeding where the offense was not committed against
that Court, and added that the inherent power to disbar extends only
as to practice in the court pronouncing judgment.3 The Kentucky
Court expressly refused to accept this distinction.
'Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1936), Sec. 101-1, 101-2.
2 Ky. Const., Sec. 110.
3 Ibid., Sec. 28.
Commonwealth ex rel. Ward v. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41, 98 S. W.
(2d) 53 (1936).
6 In re Haddad, 106 Vt. 322, 173 Atl. 103 (1934); State v. Cannon,
196 Wis. 534, 221 N. W. 603 (1928); in re Hansen, -Mont.-, 54 Pac.
(2d) 882 (1936); in re Mayberry, -Mass.-, 3 N. E. (2d) 248
(1936); in re Brown, -S. D.--, 264 N. W. 521 (1936); In re Egan,
22 S. D. 355, 117 N. W. 874 (1908); in re Royall, 34 N. Mex. 554, 286
Pac. 156 (1930); in re Wolfe's Disbarment, 288 Pa. 331, 135 Atl. 732
(1927); Payne v. State, -Ga.-, 183 S. E. 638 (1936).
0In re Sizer, 300 Mo. 369, 254 S. W. 82 (1923). See also, in re
Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. (2d) 972 (1933).
7Legal Club of Lynchburg v. Light, 137 Va. 249, 119 S. E. 5
(1923).
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The Arizona Court held that it had jurisdiction in an original
proceeding to disbar where the defendant had appropriated funds
of his client.8 A Washington case was cited in which original juris-
diction was assumed where the defendant had committed an offense
against the Supreme Court.' In that case, however, another Washing-
ton case was distinguished in which it was held that the inherent
power to disbar did not apply, under the Constitution, where the
offense charged was not committed against the Supreme Court.10
Although the Arizona Court apparently decided on the authority of
the Washington case, the facts do not come under the Washington
limitation on the rule and the holding in Arizona is squarely In sup-
port of the Kentucky decision. It is submitted that the Virginia and
Washington limitations are unnecessary restrictions on the inherent
power of the judiciary which is admitted in both jurisdictions.
Although it appears that no case has examined the dual phase of
the courts' functions as minutely as the Kentucky opinion, one case
has asserted that the power of the courts to disbar is as much the
law of the land as the constitution." It seems that the only analysis
that will support this conclusion is that employed by the Kentucky
Court, for it is fundamental that constitutional restrictions apply gen-
erally to all departments of government.
Carried to the logical conclusion, the foregoing argument In sup-
port of original jurisdiction, necessarily disposes of the contention
that the statute provides for an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive power. If it be conceded that disbarment is an inherent judicial
function, then there could be no objection to a statute which gives
judicial power to the judiciary. A recent case has held that a statute
which gives an independent board power to discipline attorneys is void
as a delegation of judicial power.? The usual objection to a statute
of this type is that the legislature has encroached upon the judiciary."
It has also been held that the legislature could not irrevocably sur-
render the right to prescribe minimum requirements for admission
to the bar.1 ' A distinction has been made, however, between the power
to admit attorneys and the power to disbar."
Although the courts are not strictly bound by statutes, they
8 In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 248 Pac. 29 (1926).
'In re Robinson, 48 Wash. 153, 92 Pac. 929 (1907).
20 In re Waugh, 32 Wash. 50, 72 Pac. 710 (1903).
"Danforth v. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N. W. 1021 (1909).
2In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676, 266 Pac. 665 (1928).
aIn re Tracy, -Minn.-, 266 N. W. 88 (1936); De Krasner v.
Boykin, -- Ga.-, 186 S. E. 701 (1936); in re Myrland, 45 Ariz. 484,
45 P. (2d) 953 (1935); in re Egan, supra, n. 5; in re Lavine, -Cal.-,
41 P. (2d) 161 (1935); in re Wolfe's Disbarment, supra, n. 5.
"Ex parte Steckler, 179 La. 410, 154 So. 41 (1934).
In re Royall, supra, n. 5.
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will follow reasonable legislative regulations."6 It is not clear from
the cases whether this is considered as an exercise of legislative
power or a permissible encroachment upon the judiciary, but the
latter seems to be the prevailing view. Therefore, a statute, to the
extent that it confers this reasonable amount of control to the court,
does not delegate legislative power to the courts. A further consid-
eration is pertinent, for, although a delegation of power is involved, a
certain degree of delegation is permissible. The power to disbar seems
to come under this permissive type, especially since the regulation of
attorneys generally is not exclusively a legislative function.17
While the foregoing analysis supports the result reached by the
Kentucky Court, the argument advanced in that decision indicates a
restriction on the power of the legislature in the field of disbarment
which seems to be the most serious objection to the constitutionality
of the incorporated bar acts generally. This question was not pre-
sented in the Kentucky case since the Court had acted under the
mandate of the legislature, but it is suggested in the opinion that
the Court would not be forced to follow the rules of the legislature
concerning discipline of the bar.
It appears that there are no jurisdictions in which it is clearly
established that the court is bound by the action of the legislature as
to disbarment proceedings. In one jurisdiction the court construed
a statute as prohibiting disbarment for the acts alleged and clearly
recognized that it was bound by the statute and prevented from dis-
barring the accused1 s In a later case, however, the Court, while not
invalidating the statute, disbarred the defendant for acts not clearly
within its terms and the Court inclined to the position of the
majority."9 A somewhat similar situation prevails in Oklahoma.
Many courts have given effect to statutes out of a spirit of
cooperation with the legislature although they did not consider them-
selves bound by the statutes. This situation has been brought out by
a recent writer.=
18 State Board of Bar Examiners v. Phelan, 43 Wyo. 481, 5 P. (2d)
263 (1931); Burns v. State, -Tex.-, 76 S. W. (2d) 172 (1934);
Do Krasner v. Boykin, supra, n. 13; in re Evans, 72 Okl. 215, 179 Pac.
922 (1919); Green, The Court's Power Over Admission and Disbarment
(1926), 4 Tex. Law Review 1; Dowling, The Inherent Power of the
Judiciary (1935), 21 American Bar Association Journal, 635.
1 7In re Constitutionality of Section 251.18, Wisconsin Statutes,
204 Wis. 501, 236 N. W. 717 (1931).
i 8 State v. Ebbs, 150 N. C. 44, 63 S. E. 190 (1908).
19 State ex rel. Solicitor v. Johnson, 171 N. C. 799, 88 S. E. 437
(1916); on second appeal, 174 N. C. 345, 93 S. E. 847 (1917).
2 State Bar Commission v. Sullivan, 35 Okl. 745, 131 Pac. 703
(1912); in re Saddler, 35 Okl. 510, 130 Pac. 906 (1913); in re Evans,
supra, n. 16
2 Dowling, supra, n. 16.
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While it is difficult to determine what the courts will consider a
"reasonable regulation" of disbarment proceedings, it must be taken
as generally true that only such statutory regulations will be given
effect as the courts consider to not interfere with their "inherent
power" over the subject.
HENR 0. WEnnoW.
RES IPSA LOQUITUR-MALPRACTICE--OTHER INJURY
In a Kentucky case decided in 1936 a child was taken to a hos-
pital for a tonsillectomy. One of the child's teeth was knocked out
during the operation and became lodged In its lung. As a result of
the tooth being in the child's lung it died and its parents sued the
hospital in which the operation was performed. The plaintiff sought
to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court rejected the
application of the doctrine saying:
"Where it is left entirely to speculation whether a fact occurred
as a result of want of care or was something not reasonable to be
foreseen, the facts are not sufficient to call for an application of
the rule of res ipsa loquitur."1
An early Kansas case seems to clearly enunciate the holding of
the recent Kentucky case above set out. The court held: "The ques-
tion of negligence or lack of skill in a surgical operation Is one of
science, to be determined by the testimony of skillful surgeons instead
of presumptions."2
In another case following the Kentucky line of reasoning where
a dentist was removing a decayed tooth and part of it went down the
patient's throat, the court said:
"To say that the doctor had complete control of either the
tooth or the mouthpack would be carrying the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur too far for a mishap such as the flying of a fragment of
tooth or filling into a patient's throat while the tooth is being
extracted, is not of itself evidence of negligence or want of skill
on the part of the doctor."'
In a case where the facts were similar to the principal case a
California court treated such circumstances contra, saying: "The pre-
sumption of a surgeon's negligence arose from child's loss of tooth
following surgeon's insertion of gas preliminary to the operation to
remove tonsils." The court further stated that res ipsa loquitur
applies where during the performance of surgical or other skilled
operations, an ulterior act or omission occurs, the judgment of which
does not require scientific opinion to throw light upon the subject,
1 Hazard Hospital Co. v. Comb's Admr., 263 Ky. 252, 92 S. W.
(2d) 35 (1936).
2 Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 33 (1870).
3 Bollenback v. Bloomenthal, 341 II. 539, 173 N. E. 670 (1930).
